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David Morgan: It has been ten years since a group of about ninety
Egyptian Military Officers put an end to the feudal system in their country and
overnight seized control of the country after an a coup in which hardly a drop of
blood was shed. Those ten years have been years of constant revolution and continuous
change. This historic operation remains steady, however, perhaps the present time
is the most favorable to look back not only to the events of the past ten years
but further back to the onset of your revolutionary feelings.
The President: I have often been asked the question, “When did
you first become a revolutionary?” It is a question that is impossible to answer
the feeling was dictated by the circumstances of my upbringing and formative years,
it was fuelled by a general feeling of frustration and defiance which swept through
all those of my generation in both schools and universities and transmitted itself
to the armed forces.
I still remember my first clash with the powers that be (authority). It was in 1933;
at the time I was a student in Alexandria not yet fifteen years old. I was crossing
Mansheya Square in Alexandria when I came across a clash between a student demonstration
and the police. I hadn’t a moment’s hesitation as to which side I was on. I immediately
joined the demonstrators without having the slightest idea as to what they were
demonstrating for. I felt no need to question; I saw members of the public involved
in a clash with the powers that be and unhesitatingly aliened myself on the side
in opposition to the powers that be.
For a while the demonstrators had the upper hand, however, back up was swiftly brought
in, two lorry loads of police men as reinforcement. They attacked us, I recall having
thrown a stone in a hopeless gesture but they overtook us in the twinkle of an eye.
I tried to escape but as I turned a police baton came down on my head followed by
another as I fell. I was taken off to detention along with a number of students
who had not been able to escape quickly enough with my head bleeding profusely.
At the police station they tended to my head wounds, I asked about the cause of
the demonstration and found out it was organized by the Misr Al- Fatah Party (Young
Egypt) in protest against the government’s policy.
I entered jail as an enthusiastic student and left fraught with rage. A long time
passed before my ideas, beliefs and plans took shape but even at that early stage
I knew my country was embroiled in a continuous struggle for freedom.
Morgan: Mr. President, what can you tell us about your formative
years and the family atmosphere in which you lived your childhood?
The President: I am the eldest son of a petite bourgeoisie Egyptian
family. My father was a junior clerk with the postal service with a monthly salary
of about twenty pounds which only just covered the bare necessities of life.
I was born in Alexandria but my first memories are of Khatatba village, it lies
between Cairo and Alexandria and is where my father worked as a postman. We were
a happy family ruled by my father although the staying power belonged to my mother
who my siblings and I loved with devotion.
Even when I was just a student my political opinions worried my father. His brother
had been jailed during the First World War for political agitation and so it was
natural that he should fear that my fate would be the same as my uncle’s. his one
wish was that we live a safe life far from turmoil.
However, after my participation the first political demonstration I entered the
fields whole-heartedly. I became head of the Resistance Organization Committee which
included resisting foreign control. We would walk the streets of Alexandria in heated
demonstrations; this was a necessary outlet for our intense emotions and our sense
of the oppression that weighed down our nation.
Finally those in authority at my school got fed up with my activities and they alerted
my father. He sent me to live with my uncle in Cairo where I went to another school.
Morgan: Many of those who dealt with your life story mentioned
that it was during this period that your initial feelings of animosity towards the
Jews came into being as there were a number of Jewish families in the same house
where your uncle lived?
The President: That opinion could not be further from the truth.
There was never a time when I was anti-Semitic on a personal level. It is difficult
for an educated Arab to be anti-Semitic. There have always been strong bonds between
the Arab and the Jewish peoples; Moses himself was Egyptian. My feelings of enmity
towards Israel and my actions against it evolved later from one thing only the Zionist
Movement that led to the usurpation of a piece of Arab land.
Morgan: the writers of your history also say that during this period
you suffered a psychological trauma!
The President: That is true. At that time something happened that
affected me emotionally more than anything else had in those early years. My father
was adamantly opposed to my revolutionary feelings and actions as for my mother,
she regarded politics as something that was of no interest to her. Our relationship
was one of unconditional love that binds a mother and her son.
I was not excessive in going to visit my family but when I had not heard from my
mother for a while I went to see them. When I got there, there was no sign of her;
I found out she had died a few weeks back and no one had had the courage to tell
me I, however, found out in a way which shook my whole being.
I immediately returned to Cairo where I dedicated myself to my political activities
with even more intensity than before. Time alleviated the trauma but I kept my distance
from the family for a number of years. Losing my mother was a very sad experience
in itself, losing her in that way was traumatic and it left a scar that time could
not heal. My personal pain and sorrow I experienced at the time made it very distasteful
to me to inflict pain and sorrow on others in the subsequent years.
Morgan: Some historians claim that your quest for a field for political
action led to your broad attempt to explore the active political parties in Egypt
at the time.
The President: in those formative years I was interested in all
political parties whose goal was to give the Egyptian people their liberty back.
Following the demonstrations in Alexandria I joined the Misr Al- Fatah Party which
I subsequently left when I realized that in spite of their lofty claims they achieved
nothing substantial.
I was approached on a number of occasions to join the Communist Party. However,
in spite of my having studied the Marxist doctrine and Lenin’s works there were
two basic obstacles in my way. Two obstacles I knew I could not overcome. The first
of these being that at heart Communism is atheist and I have always been a true
Moslem with an unshakeable belief in a Higher Power which is God who controls our
destiny. It is impossible for a p[erson to be a true Moslem and a true Communist.
The other obstacle was my awareness that Communism necessarily meant that there
would be a form of control exerted by the international Communist Parties; this
too was something I completely rejected. My colleagues and I struggled long and
hard to wrestle the power away from the feudal classes and shatter foreign control
over Egypt so our country could achieve the genuine independence it so badly needed
and, therefore, the mere hint of foreign control was something I could not accept.
I had numerous communications with the Moslem Brotherhood although I was never a
member of the party. I sensed the power of their leader the mentor Hassan al-Banna
and here once again I found religious obstacles for the actions of the Moslem Brotherhood
showed a form of religious fanaticism and I would not deny my doctrine nor allow
a fanatic sect to rule my country. I was convinced that religious tolerance was
one of the essential pillars of the new society I hoped to see established in my
country.
My future plans took shape after the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which
resulted in the Wafd Government issuing a decree directing the establishment of
a military college for boys irrespective of their affluence or social class. So
a group of us, who remained intimate friends after that, were among the first who
were able to make use of the situation and so I joined the army after I had been
studying at the Faculty of Law.
I graduated as second lieutenant from Abasseya Military College in 1938. Two officers
graduated in the same year, these were Zakaria Mohy El-Din and Mohamed Anwar Al
Sadat whose names later became intrinsically linked to the story of the revolution.
Up until this time the Egyptian army was a non-combatant army and it was to the
advantage of the British that it remain thus. There followed, however, the advent
of a new class of officer who regarded their future in the army as simply a part
of a larger struggle for the liberation of their people. The three of us were appointed
at Mankabad Garrison which is far away near Assyout in Upper Egypt. We went to Mankabad
full of lofty ideals but we were soon disappointed; most of the officers were incompetent
and corrupt, some of my colleagues were driven to the point of resigning. On my
part, I could not see the point in resigning even though I was no less dissatisfied
than everyone else, my thoughts instead were of forming the army and purging it
from corruption.
I moved to Alexandria in 1939, there I met Abdel Hakim Amer. He shared my deep-rooted
belief in the need for revolution and change.
A short time after the Second World War broke out I was transferred to a British
battalion based behind battle lines near Al Alamayn. I was sent there for a month’s
training and it was the first time for me to have any actual contact with British
people and soldiers; they left a good impression on me.
There was no discrepancy between my ability to have friendly feelings towards a
number of them on a personal level, my respect for them as soldiers and my deep
feeling that British control and power must be put an end to at any price. The former
was a matter of personal feelings the latter a matter of principle and there is
no connection between the two.
It was during this period that the idea of a revolution took root firmly in my mind,
although how it would be carried out still needed looking into. I was still feeling
my way about and, at the time, most of my efforts went towards bringing together
a large number of young officers who, I felt, in the depth of their hearts’ believed
in the good of the nation for with that alone we could come together to serve this
common cause.
Morgan: how did the serious business of organizing revolutionary
cells begin?
The President: We needed something that would make us all aware
of the inescapable and pressing need for our revolutionary movement and the British
gave us what we needed. In 1942 Britain was fighting with her back to the wall.
In the Western Desert the war was at a vital stage and the British were determined
that there should be a government in Egypt that positively supported them. Sir Miles
Lampson, the British Ambassador to Egypt, met with King Farouk at Abdin Palace in
Cairo which was first surrounded by British tanks. He presented the King with an
ultimatum whereby he either make Mustafa Nahhas Prime Minister allowing him the
right to form a Cabinet of Ministers that cooperated with Britain or be dethroned.
The King acquiesced unconditionally.
This took place on the 4th of February 1942 and nothing has been the same since.
I was at Alamayn when I got the news, I still remember my strong reaction. That
night I wrote to a friend of mine saying, “What shall we do after this tragic event
to which we have resigned ourselves with obsequiousness and servility? The truth
is that the colonizers have only one way of terrorizing us but the day they realize
that the Egyptian people are ready to sacrifice themselves the colonizer will retreat
like a cowardly bully.”
While the events of the 4th of February brought shame upon Egypt, they also, inspired
us with a new spirit. Many were shaken out of their passivity by these events and
learned that honor should be defended at any cost.
The year 1945 was to me more than just the year the war ended. The year saw the
establishment of the Free Officers Movement that which later enkindled the flame
of liberty in Egypt. There was, however, yet another event awaiting us which would
transform our burgeoning anger and dissatisfaction into a tangible plan for a revolution.
Up till 1948 my focus was on the formation of a nucleus group of people who were
as angry a I was with the way things were going in Egypt and who were possessed
of enough courage and determination to bring about the crucial change. At the time,
we were a small group of loyal friends attempting to translate our general high
ideals into a common goal and plan. I had an unquenchable thirst for knowledge and
started reading with a vengeance. I devoured books by thinkers such as: Lasky, Nehro
and Aneurin Bevan and bit by bit my Socialist ideas began to take shape.
Morgan: How did the revolutionary wave in Egypt gather momentum,
particularly following the crucial events in Palestine in 1948?
The President: in May 1948 Britain terminated her Mandate of Palestine.
We all felt that the time had come to defend Arab Rights against what we considered
to be not only a clear violation of international justice but also of human dignity.
A group of volunteers was being formed in Damascus so I went to the Mufti of Jerusalem
who was a refugee living in Misr El Gedida and offered him my services and those
of my small group to train the volunteers and fight alongside them. He said he could
not accept the offer without the consent of the Egyptian government, a few days
later he rejected the offer.
I was upset as this was a chance for young Egyptian officers to prove their worth.
I applied for a time off so as to be able to join the volunteers but before my application
could be looked into the Egyptian government officially ordered the army to join
the war.
The government had made the right decision, however, the method in which it was
carried out was catastrophic.
The Arab armies where not coordinated,leadership operations at the highest level
were non-existent, our arms were often proven to be duds moreover at the peak of
battle the Engineering Corps was ordered to build a recreational chalet in Gaza
for King Farouk.
It became apparent that the High Command was interested in one thing only, occupying
the largest stretch of land irrespective of its strategic value or our general position
thus our ability to defeat the enemy in the battle. I was enraged by the armchair
or desk officers who knew nothing about battlefields or soldiers’ suffering.
The last straw was when I was issued orders to lead a force of the sixth infantry
battalion to Iraq-Suidan which was under Israeli attack. Before we started to move
a detailed account of our movements was published in the Cairo newspapers. El-Faloga
then came under siege and I took part in the battles in which the Egyptian army
went on fighting even though greatly outnumbered by the Israeli army till the war
ended with the Armistice Agreements brought about by the United Nations.
Ahmed Abdel Aziz, the chief commander of the volunteers was killed during the assault
when his car was attacked on its way to a meeting in Jerusalem. Ahmed Abdel Aziz
always said, “The real battle is in Egypt.”
I too was almost killed during the war. I was wounded twice, the second time a bullet
missed my heart by no more than five centimetres below my heart. While I was bedridden
in hospital many thoughts and ideas went through my head.
Morgan: It would appear that events gained momentum after the Palestinian
War.
The President: At that point it became clear that the real battle
was in Egypt. While my colleagues and I were fighting in Palestine, Egyptian politicians
were accumulating money from the profits gained by buying dud arms cheap and selling
them to the army. Therefore, it became essential that we focus our efforts towards
striking a blow against the Mohamed Ali Dynasty. Thus, King Farouk was our main
target from the end of 1948 to 1952. Gradually, we established our organization
and coordinated our activities. Guerrilla warfare broke out against British establishments
in the battle zone. I was aware that it was vital that we not carry our any attempt
to seize control before we were completely ready. It was my intention to launch
our revolution in 1955 but events dictated that we decide to launch it much earlier.
Due to the rapid chain of violent events at the onset of 1952 the idea was that
the only solution was the assassination of the heads of the old system. We commenced
with General Sirri Amer one of the army leaders who had become gravely involved
in serving the Palace. Although my natural instincts were against this policy I
took on the responsibility of the first attempt.
It was an unforgettable night. The colleagues I had chosen to take part and I hid
behind the hedges that surrounded the General’s villa. When he left his car, two
of my colleagues opened fire on him with their automatic rifles. As we ran to escape
we were followed by the heartbreaking sound of a woman wailing as well as terrified
screams.
I could not sleep a wink that night for thinking of what I had done, I remember
praying to God that he would not die. I was relieved when I read in the morning
newspaper that he had not been hit by a single bullet. It was the first and last
assassination attempt I ever made; everyone agreed with me that we should not go
down that path but rather direct our efforts towards positive revolutionary change.
The tension gradually became more intense till it reached its peak, thus began the
battle of revolutionary mobilization. We began the regular issuance of the “Free
Officers” pamphlets, these were printed and distributed in secret.
Events developed with a rapidness that was beyond our control. Politicians began
accusing each other and the people began to express their anger and frustration
publicly. On the 26th of January 1952 Cairo tragically went up in flames and the
authorities took no action. Prime Minister Al Nahhas did not leave his home in Garden
City and King Farouk stayed put at Abdin Palace. Orders were not issued to the army
to intervene until the afternoon, after the fire had destroyed four hundred buildings
resulting in extreme losses and left 12 thousand homeless. The losses incurred reached
22 million pounds.
It is difficult to pinpoint who should shoulder the blame for the tragedy. The day
had started with a violent demonstration by fundamentalist groups, however, it was
later taken over by the angry masses subsequently took control of it and thus it
grew out of the control of any Organizations. The government’s hesitancy, however,
was the direct cause of the destruction of the city. Things went from bad to worse,
two ministries were formed then dissolved while the King showed no signs of trying
to solve the issue, thus we found ourselves in open opposition to him.
Morgan: As far as I understand the open and blatant struggle between
the Free Officers and the King was over the crises of the elections at the Military
Officers’ Club.
The President: That is right. The King was overwhelmed with fear
that the Club would become a hotbed of rebellion. He therefore insisted that the
new head be his candidate General Hussein Sirri Amer.
I was no less insistent that this would not happen so my colleagues in the Free
Officers’ Association and I nominated General Mohamed Naguib a well known generals
in the Egyptian army. We campaigned extensively for him and he was elected by a
vast majority however, the elections were cancelled by direct orders from the King.
During this period, the King and his government had moved to Alexandria as was their
wont every summer. In spite of all our caution it became clear to the King’s advisors
that something was about to happen and their fact-finding efforts were certainly
stepped up.
The King dissolved the executive committee of the Officers’ Club whereas the Minister
of Warfare issued a decree appointing General Naguib director of the border guards
in Cairo, while a large number of officers were transferred haphazardly to remote
stations.
I felt that it was impossible to delay our attempt to launch a revolution till 1955
for events were moving rapidly and the revolutionary spirit was sharpening its claws,
moreover, Farouk’s standing at its weakest. I judged that the situation ripe for
a oup if we knew how to carry it out quickly and efficiently.
In mid July I called for a meeting with those of the members of the founding committee
of the Free Officers who were in Cairo. I informed them that the possibilities of
launching a revolution were good. I was not of the opinion that the King should
be executed for I felt that bloodshed led to more bloodshed and I wanted the revolution
to set the standards by which it would be judged.
There were a number of problems involved in the setting down of my original plan
some of which I did not figure out until we actually commenced.
One of these problems, for example, was that the Royal Guards were made up of six
battalions which by far outnumbered the men on whom I could count and I did not
know how the Royal Guards would act. Furthermore, the possibility of British or
American intervention on behalf of the King was a point of concern.
Another of my problems was that many of the Free Officers were stationed in remote
areas which rendered them unable to aid us. There were only three hundred officers
in Cairo who could offer definite support. I had decided that I would not directly
involve many of them as discretion was vital to our success. On the other hand,
I thought it prudent to leave behind an additional force of colleagues who seethed
with the revolutionary spirit in order to carry the torch if our attempt failed.
Following a number of meetings held in a variety of homes I drew up the general
plan giving it to Abdel Hakim Amer to attend to the details. We wanted to execute
it in twenty four hours the night of the 21st of July. It was, however, impossible
to carry out our plan on that basis and therefore zero hour was postponed to one
o’clock on the morning of the 23rd of July.
Morgan: It must have been an exciting night, the memories of which
will last for a long time. Would you tell us the main outlines of events that night?
The President: On the 22nd of July, at about ten o’clock in the
evening, an intelligence officer who was a member of our Association came to my
home. Although he had not been informed of our intentions, he had come to warn me
that the Palace had caught wind of the fact that the Free Officers were preparing
to make their move and had contacted the Military Chief of Staff who called for
an emergency meeting at eleven o’clock to take measures against us.
A decision had to be taken immediately if we carried out everything at the agreed
zero hour of one o’clock in the morning they might get us before we got them. On
the other hand, orders had been given and it was very difficult to get in touch
with all those involved in the plan.
We had been joined by intelligence officers. Abdel Hakim Amer and I went to gather
troops from the Abbasseya Barracks. We arrived too late for the Military Police
had barricaded the barracks, we proceeded to the cavalry and armed vehicles barracks
and found that once again they had been quicker and the Military Police were on
guard at all the entrances.
For a while it seemed that our whole plan was in danger, there were only ninety
minutes left to zero hour. It appeared that the whole plan for the revolution had
entered one of those critical stages in history when a higher force than us intervened
to direct events. Due to the development of events it became clear to me that God
was on our side that night.
We proceeded to the Almaza Barricades as a final resort. Abdel Hakim Amer and I
were in my small car, an Austin, on our way we were met by a line of soldiers going
in the same direction in the dark. They made us leave the car and arrested us, however,
they were in fact our troops and they were carrying out my orders to arrest without
argument all officers above the rank of Chief Commander. The soldiers did not know
who I was so they ignored everything we said for about twenty minutes every minute
of which were of extreme value. Orders were not issued immediately to release Abdel
Hakim Amer and myself these were only issued with the advent of Major Youssef Sidik
the head of the group and one of my close colleagues who came to find out what the
racket was about. I was never as happy in my life as I was to see Youssef Sidik
appear out of the darkness. He had moved at the appointed time and was awaiting
the agreed zero hour to start the attack.
We joined the line of soldiers, I had decided we should not wait, we headed towards
the Headquarters of the High Command with a force of no more than a squadron but
we had the element of surprise on our side.
On our way we detained a number of army leaders who had attended the meeting held
at Headquarters entailing the attack on us.
There was a short skirmish at the entrance of the headquarters after which we forced
our way in. There we found there the Chief of Staff at the head of the table who
along with his assistants was planning the procedures to be taken against the Free
Officers. We detained all of them.
At three o’clock in the morning the same group of officers who had met a few days
previously, met once again. This time, however, the meeting was held at the meeting
hall of the Headquarters of the High Command. I dispatched someone to bring General
Naguib whom we had approached two days previously to join us in the case of the
success of our attempt. We had not informed him of the night’s events but it was
clear that he had prior knowledge of what had taken place.
The King’s Minster of Interior had phoned him half an hour earlier to find out what
was happening. He was able to say he knew nothing without having to lie.
The first steps were a complete success all that was left was to ensure that the
King could not organize a counter attack. In the morning we got in touch first with
the American Embassy then the British one to inform them that the Free Officers
had taken over control, that everything was going smoothly and the lives and possessions
of foreigner nationals were safe so long as there was no external interference.
At seven o’clock in the morning we made an announcement to the people via the radio
informing them that the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers had been deposed and the country
was in the hands of the army. Moreover, the army was under the supervision of men
whose efficiency, integrity and patriotism the people could put complete trust in.
Half an hour previously the King had asked the leader of his army what was taking
place, he had answered, “Merely a storm in a teacup, your Majesty!”
We were now faced with the problem of how the King would act. Some of us were of
the opinion that he should be tried and executed. I was still of the opinion that
as far as was possible the revolution should be bloodless and that the King should
be deported as soon as possible.
The King turned to the American ambassador asking him to intervene on his behalf
with the Cabinet formed after the revolution to save his life. We did not want his
life but wanted to depose him.
The King signed the document of abdication twice. After having read it he signed
it the first time but his hand was shaking and so he had to resign it; he was in
an almost hysterical state. We allowed him to take what he wanted with him, our
only condition being that he be on deck of the Royal Yacht at Alexandria Port before
six o’clock in the evening. In spite of his terror, the King was able to prepare
273 bags and crates!
His abdication was announced on the radio to the people at six o’clock in the evening
at the same time that he set sail from Alexandria on his Royal Yacht. He was clad
in the official white uniform of the Naval High Commander. General Mohamed Naguib
bade him farewell on deck the yacht and the King’s last words were, “I was preparing
to do to you what you have done to me.”
The first stage of the revolution was a success and what remained was for us to
create a future worthy of all the suffering.
Morgan: I have followed the events leading up to the revolution
and its subsequent success. What happened later when you began to govern?
The President: The revolution was a success, however neither I
nor my colleagues of the Free Officers had any desire to rule. We were determined
to erase all traces of foreign control and to carry out decisive agricultural reform
in order to put an end to the feudal system that had disappeared three hundred years
previously in Europe. I wanted the responsibility to belong to a Party whose leaders
could be trusted to work within the limits inspired by the revolutionary spirit.
At the beginning all Parties clapped and cheered. The Wafd, the Moslem Brotherhood
and the Communist Party thought the revolution was theirs. They thought it would
be easy for them to form a group of young enthusiastic army personnel who were in
agreement with their ideology, they, however, failed to realize the driving power
behind the aim of the revolution.
I spoke with the leaders of all Parties but found no one who was ready to put the
welfare of the people before that of their Party. In fact, I went even further.
I offered to shift control to the Wafd Party under the condition that they evacuate
the British from the Canal area and carry out the agricultural reform which would
limit agricultural ownership to two hundred acres per person. They, however, rejected
the idea of agricultural reform preferring rather to toy with the idea then side-step
it.
Thus, with heavy hearts we shouldered the responsibility ourselves. Most of my time
was taken up by work and I rarely found time for anything else.
Morgan: The responsibility of ruling must have been a new experience
in comparison to your previous work.
The President: True, I soon found out that ruling a country was
vastly different from leading an army battalion, there were, however, similarities.
I realized the necessity for planning at a very early stage. The reformations we
wanted to bring about had to be carried out in accordance with a long-term plan.
During this phase I concentrated on planning and discussed it with all those who
had ideas and experience with it at any chance I got.
I recall that planning was the topic of my first lengthy conversation with Pandit
Nehru. During one of his visits to Cairo we sailed on a yacht in the Nile and had
a five hour discussion about his personal experience of planning in India.
I could not consider myself an expert, moreover, there were only a limited number
of experts at our service particularly in the vital field of economy. Experts, in
spite of everything, may often pose a burden rather than an aid. They may be set
in their chosen ways and, therefore, I prefer thinkers to experts. Thinking results
first in the general framework for the movement after which follows the role of
experience to serve it.
Morgan: May I now jump to the Suez Crisis? This issue, as you know,
is of great concern to British public opining.
British public opinion wishes it could turn back time and take a different decision.
There is regret in Britain for what has happened, and I would like to ask you if
you would do the same again, if the same happened again?
The President: On my part, I regret nothing. If the same were to
happen again, I'd take the same actions again.
However, the events of this crisis that rocked the world, threatened to drag it
into a third major war since the beginning of the century. Let us examine the causes
behind it.
One of the firm principles stated by the revolutionary policies was the abolition
of foreign control and the restoration of national dignity for every Egyptian. This
dignity is a natural heritage. I was determined to achieve our full independence,
and protect it from any intrusion, no matter what this cost me. This policy was
expressive of a general temperament which was starting to pervade the whole Arab
World.
Western leaders did not understand this fact until it was too late. They believed
they were but confronting the determination of a single man. Their perception of
the Arabs was the same as that prior to World War Two. They did not realize that
they were now facing whole nations that aimed at establishing their futures with
their own hands, and that rejected any form of dependency henceforth.
John Foster Dulles – U.S. Secretary of State – was the first with whom I had a long
discussion. He had visited Cairo aiming to convince me to link Cairo with the Western
Alliance. As we were talking, Dulles tried to persuade me that communism was the
greatest threat to face the world, and that there was no means to overcome its challenges
except through the establishment of a strong military alliance.
I sought to persuade him that the conflict was not the resistance of an external
assault, for the new borders were internal ones. The danger is not posed by nuclear
bombs or armies, but by the battle to control people's minds and spirits. I appreciated
the threats of communism to Egypt, but these dangers could only be combated by raising
the people's standards and replacing bondage with a free dignity in a nation that
had been deprived of morale for a long time.
I pointed out to Mr. Dulles that in the wake of these huge efforts we exerted to
achieve independence, I would not be honest with my people if I tied them to an
alliance with the selfsame state that had occupied our land for over 70 years, against
another state with which we had not connection; a state whose armies were 5000 miles
away.
I also informed him of my intention to build our military forces, so that we would
be able to defend our borders ourselves.
Shortly afterwards I met with Anthony Eden face to face – when he was the Foreign
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. That day he was spending a night in Cairo on
his way to Singapore. I found it far more difficult to clarify our position to him
than I had with Dulles. I said to him: "We cannot link ourselves to any world-bloc.
In the case of an attack on Egypt from East, I would certainly ask for help from
the West." I then added, "In the case of an attack from the West, I will not hesitate
to ask the East for help." He stated that the possibility of a Western state attacking
Egypt was non-existent, and it is ironic that two major Western states did in fact
participate in a military action against us, after no more than a year or so of
this statement!
I also bitterly objected to the Baghdad Alliance established and strongly supported
by Britain and France in 1955 for the same reasons. I reiterate here: "The Arab
States were subjected to a threat, namely by linking themselves to a European bloc,
and the subsequent dependency on such a bloc."
In February 1956, Selwyn Lloyd visited Egypt to hold talks on the situation in the
Middle East. He was more willing to listen to our point of view and to appreciate
us greatly. However, he failed to grasp the basics of our intellect. He was very
anxious about the propaganda we had launched then in the Middle East against the
Baghdad Alliance. I told Lloyd: "I already informed Anthony Eden last year of my
intention to wage this propaganda war. I tried to persuade him that the Arab World
as portrayed by Lawrence and Globe was no longer existent". He had replied: "Don't
forget Globe remains in Jordan".
When he returned to the British Embassy that night, Lloyd received a communique
informing him that Globe had been dismissed from his post late that same day, and
had received orders to leave Jordan the following day.
Selwyn could not fathom that Globe belonged to a vanishing world.
Meanwhile there was the problem of the construction of the Aswan Dam, by which the
farmland in Egypt would be increased by 30%, and by which water would be stored,
and fruitfully controlled in the irrigation of all lands, which were so far at the
mercy of the climate.
The construction costs of the dam were estimated at 200 million L.E. This huge project
had to be financed from abroad. However, the project was a symbol for a new Egypt.
In addition to the gain it would bring to Egypt in the form of endless benefits,
it would also be the grandest project of its kind in the world, hence a source of
pride for every Egyptian.
Preliminary negotiations for financing the project seemed promising. We received
encouragement from the USA and the World Bank. Indeed, even Britain offered to contribute
$16 million, premised upon the final approval of the American loan. Until this stage,
we had not approached the Soviets to find out their willingness to cooperate in
the construction of the High Dam in case the West withdrew their offer, even though
there were rumors in the West claiming we had approached them. However, negotiations
with Russia were not entered into before 1958.
Soon the obstacles revealed themselves. The Americans wanted to superintend our
budget, indeed to audit our books. I strongly objected to this on principle. Anyways,
I had a feeling that the Americans had decided not to see this loan through.
Our ambassador in Washington informed me in July 1956 that he was certain everything
would run smoothly if I agreed to the provisions set by the Americans. Before that
I had been fully convinced of the opposite, and yet I allowed him to return to Washington
with instructions to try to meet Dulles midways. I was certain Dulles would have
to reveal his position honestly.
At that time I had travelled to Belgrade for a week to hold talks with Marshal Tito
and Pandit Nehru. I received the news on board of the plane on my way home, and
returned to Cairo to face the consequences. I was determined to build the High Dam
which now represented all of these symbols.
Morgan: May I ask you about the decision to nationalize the Suez
Canal Company? How was it taken? What were the measures taken to face the consequences?
And how did matters escalate into an armed war?
The President: I returned from the Brioni meeting and found Dulles'
decision to withdraw the offer to partake in the financing of the High Dam. I did
not find the immediate time to examine the problem at leisure. Pandit Nehru was
a guest in Cairo on the first day, and I dedicated all my attention to him. I did
not have a minute to myself to think about this problem until he had left the country.
The problem then became a simply one, with no complexity. Since shelving the project
was an impossibility, the necessary funding had to be raised. There was no other
means to increase the national income this significantly except by nationalizing
the Suez Canal.
Today the International Law does not begrudge any state its right to nationalize
the companies established within their national borders. But I knew I was then taking
an informed risk. I knew – from my personal experience with Anthony Eden – that
he would sense the necessity to take action to protect British interests. But I
was also sufficiently certain that Britain did not have enough forces in Kenya,
Cyprus and Aden – those were the closest bases to us – to launch an instantaneous
attack. I believed that by the time Britain mobilized sufficient forces for an attack,
we would be able to mobilize the international public opinion, and pave the way
towards a peaceful solution.
I kept my silence for three days, and summoned Mahmoud Younis who had been a colleague
when I was a staff member of the Military College prior to the 1952 Revolution.
I charged him with the seizure of the Suez Canal Company operation. He was to prepare
everything for the night of 26th July, on the fourth anniversary of Farouk's abdication
of the throne. On that evening I was to give a speech at a political meeting held
in Alexandria. It was my intention to announce in that speech the nationalization
of the Suez Canal.
Everything had been prepared in advance. Egyptian soldiers were ready, with sealed
orders to take over the offices and premises of the Suez Canal Company. Mahmoud
Younis knew that the code word for launching the operation was my mention of the
name of De Lesseps in my speech. I know of nothing that went as smoothly as this
operation. As soon as I had ended my speech, the whole operation had been carried
out.
Not even I had imagined the joy with which the nationalization of the canal was
heralded, not only by the Egyptians but by the whole Arab World, too. This is probably
the first time for absolute Arab unity to manifest itself on the level of the people.
In the West, however, the reactions came just as I had expected. The press called
for a resort to force. But force, as I had anticipated, was simply not available
for use.
I firmly believed in our right to the step we had taken. The rejection of a loan
for the construction of the High Dam was a direct incentive for my taking this step,
but I had even before that formed a committee to examine the future of the Suez
Canal and propose possible projects. The Canal, after all, is Egyptian, and whatever
the situation was, a similar step had ultimately to be taken.
Although I had no intention whatsoever when I undertook this step to ever withdraw,
I was willing to enter negotiations on any level, to reaffirm free international
navigation through the Canal. I even allowed the British and the French vessels
to pass through without paying the fees due imposed by the new administration, so
as not to open the door to possible fast clashes.
The British and the French decided to freeze our assets in London and Paris, and
they called for a convention in London to be attended by all naval states and those
states with interests in the Suez Canal. We were invited to this convention, and
I intended to go. All my advisors and ministers objected, for they were certain
that the atmosphere would be extremely hostile. They could see no benefit in my
attending such a convention.
On the eve of the final decision, Eden gave a talk to the television, stating: "Look!
This is the record of Abdel Nasser." Then he showed a black sheet of paper! I then
realized that it was futile to sit down to the same table as Eden to discuss any
aspect of the issue. I knew he had reached his final decision, and there was no
use in discussing matters with a man blinded by malice, almost amounting to personal
hatred.
He then delegated Robert Menzies – Australian Prime Minister – with a proposal for
a convention to internationalize the Canal. I could only refuse.
The British and the French then took the step which they believed would undoubtedly
paralyze us. They ordered all their pilots to leave the service of the Suez Canal
Company on 14th September by midnight. Navigation operations in the Canal need under
normal circumstances 250 pilots. After the British and French pilots withdrew, we
had only 26 trained pilots and 30 trainee pilots left.
I called Mahmoud Younis and explained the situation to him. I explained to him that
the situation required that the Canal would remain open. Mahmoud Younis said to
me: "The Canal will remain open."
That night I gave a press-conference. When I was asked concerning the withdrawal
of the pilots, I simply replied: "I have given instructions to facilitate their
exit visas." The reporter was shocked, and asked me: "Is that all?" I answered:
"No. I ordered a band to play "God Save the Queen" and the "Marseillaise" for them
as they left."
These were words charged with defiance. But my confidence in Mahmoud Younis was
absolute. Nor did he disappoint me. Some pilots worked 72 hours non-stop, but the
Canal remained open. No stoppage of accidents occurred, and thus we defied the final
possible objection concerning our ability to ensure the safety of navigation in
the Canal.
At last I believed the crisis had ended. I did not believe that Britain or France
could – after all this – defy world public opinion and attack us, especially since
Britain, France and Egypt had organized meetings under the auspices of the UN. The
meeting was to be held in Geneva on 29th October. However, this meeting never took
place, for we were otherwise preoccupied on that day. On the morning of 29th October
1956, the Israelis crossed into Egyptian territory. This has all gone into oblivion
now with history, and with it the joint alarm issued by Britain and French, which
came the next day, demanding both sides to withdraw to posts 10 miles distant from
the Suez Canal within 24 hours. Else, there would be intervention. I could not imagine
that Eden would be so stupid as to attack us in conjunction with Israel. He would
thus lose every friend in the Arab World, and threaten his supply of oil. Above
all he would be blatantly defying the UN.
I instantaneously rejected the warning, and set out to prepare a plan to resist
the French-British offensive. The following afternoon I heard humming of jet-planes.
I immediately said these were not Israeli planes, for the Israelis did not have
any bombers. I rushed to the roof of my house in Misr el Gedida, from where I saw
the bombers bombing Cairo International Airport.
The moment for action had arrived. I made the Revolutionary Command Council in Gezira
my headquarters, and it became my home until the Suez War was over.
The Israeli armies which attacked Sinai met only with six Egyptian battalions. As
soon as the attack started, I issued the order for two divisions to cross the Canal,
to advance and meet the Israelis, and to enter combat in a decisive battle. The
orders were truthfully carried out, and the two divisions moved with full armament
across the Canal to meet the enemy. This was all before the British-French intervention.
But I realized that the situation was now totally different. Our plans had to be
changed, for persisting on them after circumstances had changed would mean that
I was exposing the prime of the Egyptian army to a trap, if not total extinction
in the desert. It was inevitable for them to fall between the Israeli army on the
one hand and the British-French forces along the Canal on the other.
Hence I issued orders to the two divisions to withdraw immediately, and to garrison
west of the Canal. The withdrawal operation was accomplished during the night, to
protect the forces as much as possible from an air attack, for the British and the
French were in full control of the air.
My objective was to bring the forces back to their posts before the British and
the French launched their attack on the Canal area. We succeeded in this. However,
this withdrawal left the road open to the Israelis to advance and cross the entire
breadth of Sinai. Yet it maintained the Egyptian army safe and sound, capable of
fighting a long war if need be.
I issued my orders to the Egyptian air forces not to resist the enemy air forces
which controlled the air space. I wanted to protect our air forces, and save their
strength for the time a long battle erupted. We lost some of our old planes on the
ground due to the air attack, but the new Russian Ilyushin and Mig jet fighter planes
were almost all able to fly outside Egypt to bases in Syria or Saudi Arabia. We
were also able to hide them through camouflage in secret airports in the desert.
Meanwhile I was campaigning to mobilize the public opinion to our side. This is
why the status of the British and French forces was desperate, even when they parachuted
into the Canal Zone. The General Assembly of the UN had voted a land-sliding consensus
to the unconditional withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli forces. The USA
insisted on a cease-fire, and we even saw Canada objecting to her bigger sister
Britain from the UN platform.
The situation brought the US and Russia to the same side for the first time since
the War. I never called directly upon the Russians to interfere, but Shukry el Quatli
– President of the Syrian Republic - was scheduled to visit Moscow for an official
visit on the day following the Israeli attack. He called me, and asked me if I thought
it right to postpone the visit. I answered I thought we were up to the situation
and that he should proceed with his schedules.
While Shukry el Quatli was in Moscow, the Russians asked him what they could offer
us by way of assistance. After 11 days of the Israeli attack, the Russians presented
their memo in which they mentioned the possibility of launching a swift nuclear
war, if Britain and France did not withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone. The
British and the French agreed to a cease-fire, and the British-French forces withdrew
unconditionally.
Eden offered various reasons to explain the British intervention in Suez. But I
don't find a single reason acceptable. His claim that the intervention was a police-action,
meaning the disengagement of the Egyptian and the Israeli armies, was a blatant
pretext. At that time the two armies were still 200 miles apart, with the exception
of one parachutist battalion.
The other reasons included the protection of the Suez Canal and the British supplies
of oil, as well as the protection of British lives and their possessions in Egypt.
These too are allegations. The Suez Canal was blocked for six months with sabotage
actions as a result of direct intervention. British petroleum pipes were cut off.
If British lives and possessions in Egypt were not touched during the Crises, this
is due to the Egyptian people who kept their emotions under control, and did not
resort to personal revenge upon the British subjects. In fact, not a single British
civilian was harmed throughout the Crisis.
It is my belief that the real reason for Eden's utter failure to estimate the situation
was a total misunderstanding of the situation of the Arabs in the Middle East, in
particular in Egypt. It was still his conviction that he could topple the government
by means of threatening intervention, as Miles Lampson did when King Farouk's palace
was besieged with tankers in 1942.
I think he believed that merely issuing a warning was sufficient to bring the whole
regime to its knees. He had underestimated the Egyptian people's feelings and determination
to achieve its goals.
Eden could not perceive the sense of honor had been revived throughout the whole
Egyptian people. The whole country had unified, and was determined for the first
time in a century to fight for the fatherland.
Today, the Suez War has become history, and we have forgiven the past. But do not
expect us to ever forget it.
Morgan: After the Suez War, is any cooperation between the Arab
Republic and Britain doomed? And is it Cairo's intention – as some would claim in
London – to cut off the flow of Arab oil into Britain?
The President: There are six years now between us and the Suez
War. I think relations between the United Arab Republic and Britain today enter
a new phase. There is no doubt that our heritage from the Suez venture was distrust
on both sides. It has become clear to us that colonial ideas have not died in Britain,
and I believe there are still elements in Britain that perceive of us as a source
of threat to their supply of oil in the Middle East.
Rebuilding trust on both sides will need some time. I am keen on establishing a
friendship between the United Arab Republic and Britain, just as I am keen on cooperating
with all other peoples of the world. However, the friendship I am seeking must be
a friendship between equals. It should not be a friendship premised upon the conditions
on either side. Our main aim is to establish peace and stability in the entire Middle
East. It is only possible to build and develop a modern Egypt in an atmosphere of
peace and stability.
We need every penny we can get to finance our major projects. The Suez Canal is
a source of revenues for us. To prevent the flow of oil to Western Europe from the
Middle East will lead to a drastic drop in the revenues of the Suez Canal.
We are not major oil producers in the Middle East. Yet, like all other Arab States
– we are only concerned with selling the oil we produce, for countries do not produce
oil to drink but to sell.
From an economic perspective alone, then, there is no threat to Western supplies
of oil from the Middle East, based on a fair and just commercial basis.
Morgan: After ten years since the Revolution, does your policy,
which first appeared in your book The Philosophy of the Revolution, still express
your views?
The President: Maybe the passage of 10 years since the Revolution
is an ideal stage to look back and evaluate the stretch we have covered so far,
as well as look into the future to see our way ahead. To this I say: all the goals
and basic tenets I outlined in my book The Philosophy of the Revolution still stand
firm. However, there are also many things that we should not attempt to achieve
before time.
In that little book of mine I spoke of three spheres that overlap in our lives,
namely Arab Unity, Islamic collaboration, and African solidarity. There is no contradiction
of any kind between these three. For we are, first and foremost, an Arab nation,
hence Arab Unity is a priority of what we think of. Also, the great majority of
the population in our countries is Muslim, thus all that affects the Islamic World
instantly becomes part of our concerns. As for Africa, there is no escaping our
belonging to it, even if we wanted to. We are part of the African continent, and
the Nile, the essence of our existence, gushes forth from the heart of this continent.
This natural concern with the three worlds does not mean that we seek to unify them
politically. It means that we seek to achieve a close form of cooperation between
us and these worlds.
Arab Unity is the most important issue to preoccupy us. It is clear that it is not
possible to impose a complete political unity. It is our belief that it needs to
grow out of a consensus. The first thing to pave the way for such a consensus is
the unity of thought. Hence the first thing we need to establish is a unity of thought
amongst Arab peoples, so as to achieve later on a unity through the autonomous will
of the peoples of these nations.
It is essential to leave enough space for each of these countries, since they differ
in their structure from a feudal society to a modern socialist state, so that each
country may take steps towards its development according to its capacities. The
severe turbulences storming through the Middle East can be ascribed to the fact
that the development of these countries cannot be achieved slowly over long centuries
as was the case with Western European countries. The force of ideological pressure
today is much more aggressive than ever before. The media combat non-stop to control
the minds of people. In Egypt we had to achieve in 10 years what was achieved in
Britain in 300 years no less.
To achieve a complete form of unity between countries of such diversity in their
levels of development is thus a difficult task. The political unity between Egypt
and Syria, which has temporarily been severed, was achieved in 1958 despite gross
obstacles.
When the Syrian representatives approached me about the unity, I told them – very
frankly – that I did not believe we were ready for it. I suggested that we spend
five years in preparation for a complete political unity. I suggested that we start
with an economic and social cooperation, and not to integrate the two states until
they had attained the same level of development. They insisted that time was short,
and that unity needed to be achieved immediately, or else their country would be
endangered.
Events proved me right. Many things formed obstacles on our way. Backward interests
gathered their forces against us, and – in addition to geographic barriers – brought
the unity to a setback.
Some of our enemies cheered the separation, heralding it as a bitter failure of
the unity. This is where I disagree with them. Although the political unity has
disintegrated, many gains have been achieved: the unity has promoted unified thought
between the peoples of the two nations, as evidenced by the recent revolution in
Syria.
In the Arab World we use one language, and enjoy a common history. It is not logical
to remain divided for ever.
Our interest in Africa and the Islamic World as a whole does not mean that we seek
a political unity within these two spheres. I do not believe that our integration
with any African state is an easy matter. However, we are keen on cooperating with
the African nations with whom we have much in common. Geographically we are the
portal to Africa. There is no means to escape our fate.
Morgan: Do you believe that a totalitarian state is necessary for
the first developmental phase in developing countries?
The President: I have often been asked if a totalitarian regime
is necessary in the formative stage which developing countries go through. The answer
to this question depends on what is meant by totalitarian state. There is no doubt
that the familiar Western theory of democracy is not the one and only theory. I
have said that it is important to link the election card with the bread, for the
freedom of voting can be manipulated in the case of a hungry man.
This was the state of affairs in 1952. If we had established a Western-modeled regime
right after the coup d'état in 1952, this would have resulted in the election of
a corrupt government, not very different from the government we toppled. Authority
was concentrated in the hands of one class that enjoyed all privileges.
The first essence of the Revolution was to tear down the social barriers between
classes and the redistribution of the countries wealth more fairly. It also aimed
to restore the basic freedoms to the regular Egyptian citizen, such as the freedom
to work, the freedom of sustenance, the freedom of owning the land he toils, the
freedom to protect himself and his family, and the right to a share of the national
wealth and to superintend it. These are all rights and freedoms which helped the
citizen to restore his sense of honor and personal dignity, both of which are a
natural human right.
Currently political parties are banned in Egypt, because our country is witnessing
a comprehensive revolution, one in which we need the unity of its labor, free of
the maneuvers of political feuds. I don't know when political parties will attain
a place in the life of our nation. We are about to draft a new constitution which
will lead to the establishment of a fully elected parliament dependent upon electoral
constituencies. It is inevitable that each citizen should enjoy the right to vote,
and to be able to express their opinion on every national issue, depending on its
importance. In this phase, no one will be shackled by the tightness imposed by political
sects.
As for the future, our people is not content with any form of dictatorship. We have
brought down previous dictatorships which the upper classes of the society had imposed.
The people are equally determined not to allow the country to fall prey to any alternative
dictatorship.
Morgan: Some perceive the agricultural reform you have undertaken
in Egypt as a seizure of other people's money.
The President: The press abroad often depicted our agricultural
reform policies – these policies which changed Egypt completely – to be based upon
the seizure of the possessions of the rich. Reality is totally different. We reduced
the ceiling of land ownership to a hundred acres per family. This has enabled thousands
of peasants to own the land they toiled. They had before been living in economic
slavery. The tyranny and injustice of past land-ownership was so extreme, that only
2100 people were affected by the Agricultural Reform Law.
This does not mean that all our problems have been solved. We are still facing grave
problems, for there is a great difference between taking decisive measures towards
reform, and implementing these successfully.
We are facing a steady population increase, which is one of our strongest sources
of concern. The population increased last year by 2.5%, whereas the total national
income increased by about 8%. It is essential to adopt new methods of agricultural
production, and it is inevitable for us to persuade farmers to cooperate, so as
to attain the utmost level of productive self-sufficiency. We also need huge amounts
of money for the industrialization of the country. Yes, we are facing many problems.
But I believe that we are dealing with them realistically. This nation, which is
now advancing, and for the first time in its history experiences a sense of pride
in what it has achieved, has now become a nation with a goal and with determination.
Morgan: Do you still believe that the Non-alliance movement is
possible in the current international environment?
The President: I believe that our position vis-à-vis international
affairs has today become clearer. Britain and the States tended for years to believe
that anyone who was not willing to join the Western bloc was by necessity sympathetic
to communism. For a long time, these two states found it hard to believe that genuine
non-alignment was possible.
I believe this position must change. The truthfulness of non-aligned nations, the
value of their non-alignment in a world divided into two camps, must today be faced
with appreciation. I don't believe that remaining neutral as to the East or the
West is only possible, but that it is indeed essentially adamant.
Genuine non-alignment does not mean to remain neutral in every important issue that
arises. It is impossible to nib the conscience of a nation in the bud. On the contrary,
genuine non-alignment means to judge every issue according to its reality, and to
express an opinion without any restrictions by relations or alliances.
Morgan: What about the problem of Israel?
The President: The existence of Israel in our region is impossible
to accept. It is not possible for us to go back on our determination to attain the
full recognition of the Palestinian rights, to return a million Arab refugees to
their homes in Gaza from which they have been evacuated. Any thought of reconciliatory
negotiations with the Israelis is necessarily inconsiderable. Even if they are willing
to offer financial compensation of some kind, it is impossible to buy a human beings
fatherland, or spirit, or basic human rights.
The account will be settled one day. I believe what will help achieve this is to
promote the economy of the Arab World and raise the standard of living of its people,
to reach this stage where we can exert pressure upon the Israelis and those who
support them, until they realize the futility of their resistance.
Morgan: I heard a voice in the National Conference of the People's
Forces, calling for your election as president for life?
The President: This is something I cannot conceive of. In the light
of the new constitution, the people must have the authority to elect the president.
It is nobody's right to remain president for life, for this eliminates the element
of the president's liability to the people.
Morgan: Do you believe there is a possibility of a world war erupting?
The President: I don't think – despite the tension prevailing in
the world – that a major world war will rage through the world. My talks with Khroshov
make me trust that the Russians are not willing to trigger it.
Morgan: How does the Arab Republic plan to affect the Arab World?
The President: We seek to lead the Arab World, not by military
pressures or by resorting to threats, but by presenting a role-model. It is essential
for us to prove clearly and decisively that our ideas achieve the prosperity of
our people.
Morgan: And what about the relations of the Arab Republic with
the rest of the world?
The President: Our policy is to eliminate all forms of distrust
and scepticism wherever it may exist in our relations with other nations. I believe
we will be successful in achieving this. Failing to do so will cost us dearly.
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